Greenmantle
Tue 05 Apr 2022 - 15:00
Niall began by outlining 4 major trends. The first is Globalisation which peaked in 2007 and has been declining since. It will not reverse. Secondly, we are currently in cold war 2 which is different from cold war 1 in that China is now senior partner to Russia. Thirdly, the era of low inflation is at an end due to monetary and fiscal errors resulting from the pandemic. The final major trend, which is less understood, is constant technological changes, including the transition from web 2 to web 3 which is very transformative in the broad sense and specifically in the financial world. In some ways this trend will be more historically important than geopolitical issues. Moving to the current crisis, Niall expects a final phase to play out in coming weeks as Russia focuses on the east of Ukraine. Russia could grind out a pyrrhic victory by early May. Do not expect meaningful negotiations until then as Russia needs to gain more influence. Sanctions have not been effective as Russia is still able to sell oil and until an oil embargo is in place that will not change. However, Niall does not see this occurring. China will not mediate or act as peace brokers. They will give enabling support to the Russian war effort, but not enough to warrant US sanctions. Niall expects the public to lose interest in the war as inflation becomes the dominant issue. The Biden administration is making little effort to shorten the war – as it continues there are unintended consequences/adverse implications – not just energy prices, the real issue is food prices – a huge number of countries rely on Ukraine and Russia for wheat and fertiliser, this will cause global inflation shock comparable with the 1970’s, and will create instability in some countries reliant on Ukraine and Russia. The probability of nuclear or chemical weapons goes up the worse Russia do in the war. Russia may resort to using WMD to salvage the situation. Ukrainian success could lead to ruthlessly extreme measures by Putin.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was long in the making and not difficult to foresee unless one willfully ignored history
As Greenmantle predicted in late February, there was a meaningful chance that this invasion went much less well for Putin, leading to a Russian version of the Iraq War
Those in Moscow who doubted the wisdom of Putin’s bid to emulate Peter the Great may finally find a way to weaken his grip on power
The implications of this conflict are widespread: we think the Fed is still ignoring its recent forecasting and policy failures — and the injection of stagflationary risk from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine only confounds the problem
Geopolitically, China’s “entente” or strategic partnership with Russia has forced China to walk a tightrope between supporting Moscow and broadly complying with Western sanctions: we think China was caught flat-footed by the destructiveness of the Russian invasion of Ukraine